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Is a Postmarital Agreement in Your Best Interest? 
Why Louisiana Civil Code Article 2329 Should Let 
You Decide 
INTRODUCTION 
The institution of marriage is changing. Over the last few 
decades, the United States has witnessed a persistent decrease in 
the number of individuals who choose to get married.1 In fact, the 
marriage rate has been in “steady decline since the 1970s,” and 
researchers currently report that the marriage rate has dropped to 
an all-time low.2 The public opinion of marriage has likewise taken 
a significant downturn.3 Studies show that Americans from all 
social and educational circles hold a generally unfavorable view of 
marriage as an institution.4 Overall, there seems to be a growing 
sentiment across the country that marriage is a hassle and is simply 
unnecessary.5  
Multiple factors are likely responsible for the evolution of 
marriage into a perceived voluntary, unnecessary institution in the 
eyes of modern day society.6 For example, alternative living 
arrangements are more socially acceptable today than they were in 
the past.7 Now more than ever, individuals feel comfortable living 
with a partner before marriage or even living as a single parent.8 
Therefore, couples may feel as if they have more habitational 
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 1. Megan Gannon, US Marriage Rate Drops to New Low, LIVESCIENCE 
(July 19, 2013, 12:57 PM), http://www.livescience.com/38308-us-marriage-rate-
new-low.html, archived at http://perma.cc/H2BH-WNHX. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Stephanie Pappas, Record Number of Americans Are Unmarried, 
LIVESCIENCE (Dec. 14, 2011, 8:11 AM), http://www.livescience.com/17462-re 
cord-number-americans-unmarried.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NS5S-
4MDU.  
 4. Id. 
 5. See Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for 
Premarital and Marital Agreements, 46 FAM. L.Q. 313, 317 (2012) [hereinafter 
Bix et al.]. 
 6. Some scholars suggest that several factors are responsible for the demise 
of marriage, “including a delay in marriage because of economic concerns and 
educational pursuits, greater social acceptance of cohabitation and parenthood 
outside of marriage, and arguably a growing sense that marriage is unnecessary.” 
Id. See also Stephanie Hallett, Marriage Rate in America Drops Drastically, 
HUFFPOST WEDDINGS (Dec. 14, 2011, 5:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2011/12/14/marriage-rates-in-america_n_1147290.html, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/6TD4-ZE44. 
 7. See Hallett, supra note 6; see also Bix et al., supra note 5, at 317. 
 8. See Hallett, supra note 6; see also Bix et al., supra note 5, at 317. 




options than were available in the past, causing beliefs that 
marriage is required before cohabitation to essentially fall by the 
wayside. Another factor is that some individuals postpone 
marriage until they complete their education and establish a 
career.9 Understanding potential economic concerns, many 
Americans believe that it is important to be financially stable 
before entering into a matrimonial union.10 For example, couples 
often choose to postpone marital vows until they are better able to 
support families and afford the inevitable, inherent costs of 
marriage.11  
Furthermore, husbands and wives are much more equal to one 
another in today’s world than they were in the past.12 For example, 
the gender roles that once defined marriages have largely 
disappeared.13 Wives are no longer expected to function as 
homemakers, and it is now increasingly common to find dual-
income households and wives with full-time jobs.14 However, the 
law governing marital relationships has not exhibited a similar 
equality-driven trend.15 Rather, the legal institution continues to 
administer marriage with outdated policies and antiquated 
perceptions, contributing to the general distaste for the institution 
among prospective couples.16  
In Louisiana, Civil Code article 2329 is a prime example of 
marital law that has failed to adapt to the changing reality of 
marriage.17 As the preeminent marital contracting law in Louisiana, 
article 2329 governs the implementation and modification of marital 
agreements both prior to and during marriage.18 However, article 
                                                                                                             
 9. See Hallett, supra note 6; see also Bix et al., supra note 5, at 317. 
 10. See generally Barbara A. Atwood, Marital Contracts and the Meaning 
of Marriage, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 17–19 (2012). 
 11. See Hallett, supra note 6; see also Bix et al., supra note 5, at 317. 
 12. See Lucy A. Hawke, Gender Roles within American Marriage: Are 
They Really Changing?, 5 ESSAI 70, 74 (2007), available at http://dc 
.cod.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=essai, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/6DTM-YL4X; Elizabeth R. Carter, Louisiana Prenuptial Agreements: 
Issues for Contemporary Spouses, 42 ANN. EST. PLAN. SEMINAR 1, 5 (2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2169991, archived 
at https://perma.cc/456Z-LWWX?type=pdf; Bix et al., supra note 5, at 316. 
 13. See generally Hawke, supra note 12. 
 14. See id. at 73–74. 
 15. See generally Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 
WIS. L. REV. 827, 833 (2007). 
 16. See id. at 829–31; see generally Hawke, supra note 12. 
 17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015). 
 18. For the purposes of this Comment, marital agreements executed prior to 
marriage are referred to as “premarital agreements,” and marital agreements 
executed or modified during marriage are referred to as “postmarital agreements.” 
If discussing the agreements in general, the author uses the term marital 




2329 proves to be rather complicated for spouses attempting to 
execute or modify postmarital agreements during marriage.19 
Before instituting or altering such an agreement, the parties must 
petition a court and ask a judge to determine whether the parties 
understand the proposed change and whether it is truly in their best 
interests to make such a change.20 Therefore, the decision is 
effectively taken out of the hands of the parties and given to a 
judge, allowing an outsider to determine what is in the best 
interests of the married couple.21 Consequently, spouses are unable 
to easily and efficiently alter their marital agreement during 
marriage, having to go to court to ask a judge for permission 
instead. Although a judge may agree with the spouses that a 
modification is in order, not every case is that simple. Married 
couples in Louisiana are being forced to submit to the outside 
judgment of third parties when contracting postmaritally, yet 
today’s couples are more than capable of making the unique 
determination as to what is in their best interests. 
Moreover, article 2329 employs several exemptions to the 
court-approval requirement, introducing inconsistency and 
confusion into the marital agreement arena. For example, if 
spouses were to modify their premarital agreement during their 
marriage in an attempt to switch from a separate property regime 
to the default community property regime, they would not be 
required to fulfill the court-approval requirement.22 In addition, if 
spouses had married outside of Louisiana and subsequently moved 
into the state, they could implement a postmarital agreement within 
one year of relocating without having to obtain court approval.23 
These exemptions, along with a few others, illustrate the 
inconsistent and arbitrary nature of article 2329’s court-approval 
requirement, calling into question the article’s effectiveness as a 
whole. 
                                                                                                             
 
agreements. Some jurisdictions, however, refer to these agreements as prenuptial 
agreements and postnuptial agreements, respectively. The terms prenuptial and 
postnuptial are largely foreign to Louisiana matrimonial regime law, with the 
Legislature and courts opting to refer to such agreements simply as marital 
agreements. See id. 
 19. See generally id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Despite article 2329’s use of an outsider’s decision-making in the 
marital contracting process, marriage is generally intended to be a private 
contractual matter between the involved parties. See Williams, supra note 15, at 
833. 
 22. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015). 
 23. Id. 




Overall, the court-approval requirement of article 2329 is 
outdated and unnecessary, signaling the need for a revision in 
accordance with the modern aspects of marriage and the current 
landscape of the marital institution. Due to the declining marriage 
rate across the nation,24 the outdated and inconsistent legislative 
justifications behind article 2329,25 and a general trend toward 
freedom of contract,26 article 2329 should be improved to allow 
flexibility and uniformity in the realm of marital contracting. In 
fact, the Uniform Law Commission recently passed the Uniform 
Premarital and Marital Agreements Act, legislation designed to 
update and provide equality in the laws governing premarital and 
postmarital agreements.27 This piece of model legislation serves as 
a useful example for the Louisiana Legislature to follow in 
updating the state’s marital agreement law to allow spouses the 
freedom to structure their marriages on their own terms. By 
relaxing some of the more stringent requirements associated with 
marriage, the institution should become more appealing to a wider 
range of people. Although marital agreements likely require a 
watchful eye and certain procedural safeguards, the current version 
of article 2329 is not the answer.  
Part I of this Comment offers a historical analysis of marriage, 
marital contracting in general, and the evolution of marital 
contracting laws in Louisiana, providing insight into the changing 
nature of the institution and how such evolution will likely 
continue. Next, Part II outlines the specific justifications for 
revising article 2329, offering unique theories as to why the article 
no longer makes sense in the modern landscape of marriage. 
Shifting to a study of the differing approaches to the regulation of 
marital agreements, Part III analyzes how marital contracting is 
effectively governed in other United States jurisdictions. Lastly, 
Part IV offers two alternative options that Louisiana could utilize 
to revise article 2329 and effectively adapt its marital contracting 
policies to the modern world. As this Comment illustrates, article 
2329 is a relic of the past, inefficiently governing the ever-
changing world of marriage and subjecting its participants to 
unnecessary burdens. The time is now to revise article 2329 and 
position the marital institution for a thriving future. 
                                                                                                             
 24. See infra Part I. 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (2012). 




I. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: MARRIAGE THEORY 
AND ARTICLE 2329 
As the institution of marriage has evolved over time, marital 
agreements have slowly become more important and widespread, 
and the modern-day conceptions of marriage have also morphed 
into a new phenomenon.28 Overall, marriage is a far cry from a 
static institution, but the laws employed to govern marriage have 
not evolved accordingly.29 
A. Marriage Theory: A History of Marriage and Marital 
Agreement Philosophy 
Until the 18th century, marriages commonly functioned as 
products of arrangement.30 Families and social units historically 
coordinated and planned marriages for prospective couples, with 
religious and social norms serving as the driving considerations.31 
In essence, marriage formerly operated as a mechanism by which 
families came together for “inheritance, property control, and other 
economic or political reasons.”32  
Love-based marriage is of “relatively recent vintage.”33 Ideally, 
prospective couples now engage in lasting, meaningful courtships 
prior to marriage in order to discern their true feelings.34 However, 
                                                                                                             
 28. Katherine Stoner, Prenuptial Agreements – An Overview, NOLO: LAW 
FOR ALL, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/prenuptial-agreements-over 
view-29569.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y5BE-WAJ9 (last visited Feb. 5, 
2015). Today, prospective couples no longer conceptualize marriage with the 
traditional ideals that once characterized the institution. Id. Rather, marriage is 
ultimately viewed as means to an end, rather than an end in itself. See id. 
 29. See generally Atwood, supra note 10, at 17. 
 30. Id. at 16–17 (citing STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM 
OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 24–31 (2005)). 
See also Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: 
Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453 (1998). Arranged 
marriages were very common until the 18th century. Shamita Das Dasgupta, 
Arranged Marriages, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENDER AND SOCIETY 40–42 (Jodi 
O’Brien ed., 2008).  
 31. See Rasmusen et al., supra note 30, at 500–01; Atwood, supra note 10, 
at 16–17. 
 32. Atwood, supra note 10, at 16−17. 
 33. Id. at 17. In other words, marriage has not always been a product of love 
and affection. Id. In fact, in the overall scheme of marital history, love has only 
been a driving force behind marriage for a relatively short period of time. Id. 
 34. See Ted L. Huston & Renate M. Houts, The Psychological Infrastructure 
of Courtship and Marriage: The Role of Personality and Compatibility in 
Romantic Relationships, in THE DEVELOPMENTAL COURSE OF MARRIAGE AND 
DYSFUNCTION 114–120 (Thomas N. Bradbury ed., 1998). Although this may not 
be true of all marital relationships, the overwhelming majority of lasting 




“[t]he very features that promised to make marriage such a unique 
and treasured personal relationship opened the way for it to 
become an optional and fragile one.”35 The introduction of 
personal love and subjective affection into the foundations of 
marriage has destabilized the institution; unfortunately, love often 
does not last forever in the marriages of today.36 Also, “the 
changing goals of marriage have contributed to its fragility, with 
today’s couples viewing marriage as a vehicle for personal 
fulfillment and self-realization rather than a commitment for life-
long sharing.”37 Over time, marriage has become increasingly 
unstable, causing many to initially disfavor marital agreements as 
mechanisms by which more powerful spouses were able to take 
advantage of their comparably fragile counterparts.38 In fact, for 
many years there was a widespread belief that marital agreements 
encouraged divorce and manipulated weaker spouses to waive 
financial and legal benefits.39 
As marital agreements have become more common, however, 
the law has gradually become friendlier towards them across the 
country.40 For example, divorce rates in the United States 
increased drastically around the turn of the 21st century,41 
prompting couples to begin planning their futures carefully in an 
attempt to avoid the financial difficulties implicated by the division 
of marital property.42 Therefore, in the context of divorce, courts 
across the country readily began to favor marital agreements as 
fair, equitable mechanisms available to dissolve marriages.43 
Today, in fact, premarital agreements are generally accepted 
                                                                                                             
 
marriages involve some period of premarital courtship and personal decision-
making. See id. 
 35. Atwood, supra note 10, at 17 (citing STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A 
HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR HOW LOVE CONQUERED 
MARRIAGE 5 (2005)). 
 36. See id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Stoner, supra note 28. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See William F. Fraatz, Enforcing Antenuptial Contracts in Minnesota: A 
Practice in Search of a Policy Basis in the Wake of McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 
77 MINN. L. REV. 441, 463–64 (1992). 
 42. See Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial 
Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 891 (1997). 
 43. See id. at 898–99 (noting that courts no longer consider premarital 
agreements to be void ab initio but rather are generally enforceable). 




throughout the United States.44 Many courts view such agreements 
as “conducive to the welfare of the parties and the marriage 
relationship as they tend to prevent strife, secure peace, and adjust, 
settle, and generally dispose of rights in property.”45  
Despite the favorable acceptance of marital agreements today, 
policymakers, courts, and scholars continue to recognize a 
potential for the abuse of such agreements.46 Such concerns are 
founded upon “the intimate relationship of the parties to these 
agreements, the underlying caring and nurturing union that is 
presumably being contemplated, the fact that children may be 
produced of the union, and the significant role the state has in 
regulating this relationship and protecting the spouses and 
children.”47 
In other words, with the increasingly unpredictable and 
emotional nature of marriage, scholars and policymakers recognize 
the need to regulate marital agreements, in general, to avoid unjust 
contracting and unfair impositions of will.48 Historically, such an 
argument has been founded upon the notion that spouses are not on 
a level playing field when it comes to marital bargaining power.49 
Scholars argue that “the bargaining dynamics within an intact 
marriage are materially different than the dynamics of premarital 
bargaining,” triggering the need for heightened restrictions on 
postmarital contracting between spouses.50 “These differences, 
they claim, increase the potential for fraud and deception, often 
leaving the spouse with less economic leverage (usually the wife) 
with no choice but to sign an agreement presented by the wealthier 
spouse (usually the husband).”51 However, the status of 
“bargaining theory” in the realm of marital contracting is largely in 
flux, with other scholars beginning to question the validity and 
accuracy of heightened scrutiny arguments that are founded upon 
the supposed unequal bargaining power within marriages.52  
                                                                                                             
 44. See Gary A. Debele & Susan C. Rhode, Prenuptial Agreements in the 
United States, 1 IAML L.J. 1, 2 (2006), available at http://www.iaml.org/ 
cms_media/files/prenuptial_agreements_in_the_us.pdf, archived at http://perma 
.cc/W3R5-8TXS. 
 45. 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS § 11:8, at 553–61 (4th ed. 2009) (footnotes omitted). 
 46. See, e.g., Debele & Rhode, supra note 44, at 2, 12. 
 47. Id. at 2. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Williams, supra note 15, at 829–30. 
 50. Id. at 830. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., id. at 851; see also infra Part II.B. 




B. Marital Agreements in Louisiana 
In general, the State of Louisiana “enjoys a unique historical 
acceptance of marriage contracts.”53 Marriage contracts have been 
recognized and “widely accepted” in Louisiana since the 1700s, an 
ode to the combined French and Spanish heritage upon which the 
Louisiana legal system was founded.54 When Louisiana eventually 
became an independent entity free from European control, it 
continued to view premarital contracts favorably and specifically 
endorsed such agreements in both the 1808 and the 1870 Civil 
Codes.55 Marital contracts have been expressly approved and 
accepted in Louisiana for nearly three centuries, “reflecting a 
tenacious legal folkway that stood the test of time, persevered in 
adversity, and prevailed over challenge.”56 
1. Pre-Civil Code Article 2329  
Enacted in 1979, Civil Code article 2329 currently serves as 
the chief marital contracting law in Louisiana; however, the law 
was not always detailed and explicit. Historically, Louisiana 
allowed parties to enter into premarital agreements but not 
postmarital agreements.57 For example, in January 1879, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court offered a glimpse into the application of 
pre-article 2329 marital contracting law in Hanley v. Drumm.58 
The Court, faced with a dispute between a decedent’s widow and 
the decedent’s estate, considered the validity and effectiveness of a 
marital agreement executed prior to marriage.59 In approving the 
marital agreement, the Court recognized that the parties were free to 
stipulate as they pleased with respect to property rights, provided 
that such stipulations were “not contrary to good morals.”60 In 
addition, the Court addressed the potential modification of an 
existing postmarital agreement, noting that “matrimonial agreements 
may be altered by consent before, but not after, the marriage.”61 
                                                                                                             
 53. Carter, supra note 12, at 2. 
 54. Id. (citing Hans W. Baade, Marriage Contracts in French and Spanish 
Louisiana: A Study in “Notarial” Jurisprudence, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1, 92 (1979)). 
 55. Id.  
 56. Hans W. Baade, Marriage Contracts in French and Spanish Louisiana: 
A Study in “Notarial” Jurisprudence, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1, 92 (1979). 
 57. See Hanley v. Drumm, 31 La. Ann. 106, 109 (1879). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 109–10 (“Prior to the marriage, the law treats the intended wife as 
sui juris, as a free agent; but after it, it treats her as subject to the power and 
authority of the husband, and as no longer able to protect herself. Hence it 




Therefore, as the Hanley Court recognized in the late 1870s, 
parties were generally free to contract marital agreements prior to 
marriage; however, parties were not able to modify such 
agreements after their marriages became effective.62 
The Hanley Court’s stance on the modification of marital 
agreements serves as a vivid illustration of the historical view that 
marriage was once an inherently one-sided relationship.63 Prior to 
the enactment of article 2329, postmarital agreements were 
prohibited altogether in Louisiana in an attempt to protect weaker 
spouses and guard against spousal overreaching.64 In fact, Louisiana 
has consistently attempted to protect the weaker spouse in 
marriages, from its complete bar on postmarital agreements and 
modifications in Hanley to the somewhat more lenient restrictions 
of the current version of article 2329.65  
2. The Policy and Application of Civil Code Article 2329 
Over a century after the Hanley decision, the Louisiana 
Legislature passed and enacted Louisiana Civil Code article 2329—
legislation that appears to, at least somewhat, carry on the Hanley 
tradition of protecting the weaker spouse. As did the prior law, 
article 2329 distinguishes between premarital agreements, on the 
one hand, and postmarital agreements, on the other.66 However, 
article 2329 makes a noteworthy change to the law under Hanley 
by allowing parties to enter into or modify marital agreements after 
marriage, subject to some questionable restrictions.67  
                                                                                                             
 
interposes to shield her from impositions and wrong.”). Therefore, the policies 
offered by the Hanley court appear to be in line with the legislative goals cited 
in support of article 2329. However, these policies and goals are outdated, no 
longer warranting the distinctions employed in Hanley and codified in article 
2329. See infra Part II.B. 
 62. See Hanley, 31 La. Ann. at 109. 
 63. See id. at 108–10. The law reflected an understanding that men were the 
more powerful, dominant players in marital relationships. See id. 
 64. Id. at 109–10 (explaining that the wife is “no longer able to protect 
herself” from “the power and authority of the husband” during marriage). 
 65. Id.; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015). 
 66. Compare Hanley, 31 La. Ann. at 109–10, with LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 
(2015). 
 67. Id. Although parties are able to modify marital agreements after 
marriage, the second paragraph of article 2329 imposes strict requirements on 
such agreements. For example, article 2329 requires that such an agreement be 
in the parties’ best interests. Id. Altering the Louisiana Supreme Court’s prior 
determination that marital agreements could not be altered post-marriage 
whatsoever, the Legislature made a concise determination to adapt the law to 
changing times and allow for such modifications. 




At its core, Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 is an inconsistent 
piece of legislation in the realm of marital contracting.68 Although 
article 2329 allows spouses to contract postmaritally, it does not 
treat premarital and postmarital agreements equally. Rather, article 
2329 imposes heightened restrictions on marital agreements entered 
into or modified during marriage, whereas marital agreements 
entered into or modified prior to marriage are not burdened with 
such restrictions.69 Specifically, under article 2329, a married couple 
in Louisiana is allowed to enter into a marital agreement that alters 
or modifies an existing matrimonial regime only after a “joint 
petition and a finding by the court that [the agreement] serves their 
best interests and that they understand the governing principles and 
rules.”70 However, if executed prior to marriage, the only statutory 
restrictions on marital agreements are that they must not 
undermine public policy and must be executed in the appropriate 
form.71 In addition, the Legislature codified, in article 2329, that 
spouses are able to “subject themselves to the legal regime by a 
matrimonial agreement at anytime without court approval.”72 Article 
2329 also exempts new Louisiana domiciliaries from obtaining court 
approval altogether if the postmarital agreement is executed within 
the first year after relocating to the state.73  
With specific policy concerns in mind, the Louisiana Legislature 
enacted article 2329 in 1979 with the goal “of protecting the less-
worldly spouse and preventing that spouse from entering into 
                                                                                                             
 68. See Katherine S. Spaht & Cynthia Samuel, Equal Management 
Revisited: 1979 Legislative Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes 
Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 83, 91 (1979). 
 69. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. In general, contracts must be executed within the confines of public 
policy. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 7 (2015). As a noteworthy Louisiana decision 
explained, the chief public policy concern in the realm of marital contracting is 
the notion that “a husband should support and assist his wife during the 
existence of the marriage,” and any contracts providing otherwise will be 
deemed null and void. Barber v. Barber, 38 So. 3d 1046, 1049 (La. Ct. App. 
2010). 
 72. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015). In effect, this aspect of article 2329 
illustrates the Legislature’s preference for the legal regime of community 
property in Louisiana. Spouses wishing to utilize a community property regime 
do not need judicial approval, as the Legislature has presumably decided that the 
legal regime of community property is naturally in the best interests of the 
parties. See id.; Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 91. 
 73. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015). Although the purpose of this aspect of 
article 2329 is not entirely clear, the Legislature appears to desire leniency with 
couples unfamiliar to the laws of Louisiana, allowing them to act as if they are 
starting anew in the marital agreement realm unbounded by the court-approval 
requirement. 




disadvantageous agreements that were not fully understood.”74 Article 
2329 functions as a compromise to the strict bar on postmarital 
agreements under Hanley, adapting the policy justification of 
protecting weaker spouses into a somewhat more lenient 
framework.75 Specifically, through Act 709 of the 1979 session, the 
Legislature purported to place “procedural limitations upon the 
making or the modification of a matrimonial regime contract during 
marriage and [add] limitations on the content of these agreements, 
whether executed prior to or during marriage.”76 As such, the 
Legislature defined specific distinctions between premarital and 
postmarital contracting requirements in an attempt to satisfy its 
concerns and protect women from their historically more powerful 
male counterparts.77  
The substantive suggestions and procedural limitations 
embodied in article 2329 were recommended to the Legislature by 
the Louisiana State Law Institute.78 Initially, the Law Institute’s 
proposal did not include the court-approval requirement, drawing 
the ire of some legal observers.79 For example, the Law Institute was 
urged to reconsider its original proposal by Mr. Frank P. 
Simoneaux, a concerned member of the Institute, who believed that 
“modification of the legal community by a matrimonial agreement 
[would] result in many nonworking spouses having little or no 
ownership interest in assets or income that would form part of the 
community under the legal regime.”80 Essentially, Mr. Simoneaux 
argued that the Law Institute’s original proposal was deficient, as it 
did not incorporate adequate procedural protections for disadvantaged 
                                                                                                             
 74. Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes, 54 LA. L. REV. 733, 741 (1994) 
(discussing Boyer v. Boyer, 616 So. 2d 730 (La. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 75. Compare Hanley v. Drumm, 31 La. Ann. 106 (1879), with LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 2329 (2015). 
 76. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 90. 
 77. See supra Part I.B.2. Namely, the Legislature implemented distinctions 
between premarital and postmarital contracting requirements by requiring 
spouses to obtain judicial approval when attempting to alter marital agreements 
after the marriage has taken effect. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 91; LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 2329 (2015). 
 78. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 90. 
 79. Id. at 90−91. 
 80. Id. at 91 (citing Written Motion to Reconsider Previous Council Action 
at 2, Submitted by Frank P. Simoneaux; seconded by A.N. Yiannopoulos and 
Jack Caldwell (on file with author)). Furthermore, Mr. Simoneaux’s motion 
“made clear that [his] concern in allowing spouses to enter into matrimonial 
agreements was solely for the welfare of the spouse whose contributions to the 
marriage were largely non-economic, and not for the interest of creditors or 
forced heirs.” Id. Thus, Mr. Simoneaux’s concern was grounded upon the need 
to protect against spousal overreaching. See id. 




spouses.81 Despite these concerns, the Law Institute “adhered to its 
previous position, the original position of the Law Institute, that 
contractual changes in a matrimonial regime during marriage 
required no special procedural safeguard.”82  
Thus, the original proposal of the Law Institute was submitted to 
the Legislature without any requirement of court approval.83 
However, Mr. Simoneaux’s plea was not forgotten. The court-
approval requirement for spouses entering into or modifying marital 
agreements during marriage was added into the legislative bill at the 
last minute on the floor of the House of Representatives, and this 
version of the bill eventually became law after Senate amendment 
and concurrence.84  
Faced with the diverse goals and principles of article 2329, the 
following subsections serve to illustrate specific jurisprudential 
applications of article 2329 by Louisiana courts. In effect, these 
decisions shed some light on how courts apply the complicated 
provisions of article 2329, with most courts opting to closely 
follow the article’s language and impose the heightened approval 
requirements on parties contracting postmaritally. 
a. A Basic Jurisprudential Application of Article 2329 
As one of the preeminent judicial decisions involving marital 
agreements in Louisiana, Boyer v. Boyer offers a noteworthy 
illustration of the intricacies and distinctions embodied in article 
2329 and how its requirements are applied in real-world 
situations.85 In Boyer, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal 
was tasked with determining whether a marital agreement, entered 
into by two spouses during marriage in an attempt to terminate the 
legal regime of community property, was valid in accordance with 
article 2329.86 The husband and wife in Boyer executed a “joint 
petition for [the] establishment of a separate property regime” as 
well as an affidavit stating that they read the agreement, 
understood the rules involved, and believed that the agreement was 
in their best interests.87  
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In considering this marital agreement, the court noted that the 
Boyer agreement satisfied article 2329’s requirements, as the 
spouses executed an effective document and a valid affidavit 
purporting to understand and agree to the changes.88 However, in 
Boyer, the spouses did not request a hearing in front of the court 
regarding their new marital agreement.89 Nevertheless, the court 
applied article 2329 and recognized that its plain language does not 
require a physical hearing to take place.90 The Boyer court 
explained that it found “no requirement in article 2329 for a 
hearing before the court can grant approval. Certain statutory laws 
in Louisiana do require a full hearing before a trial court can make 
a decision, but article 2329 is not one of them.”91 Rather, “it is 
within the discretion of the trial court to order a hearing and the 
parties may ask for a hearing,” but one is not required.92  
The Boyer decision provides a model benchmark for what is 
and is not required to alter or implement a postmarital agreement. 
The spouses are not required to actually appear before a court, 
although such an option is certainly available.93 Rather, the 
spouses must execute an agreement and convince the court that it 
is in their best interests to modify or implement an effective 
postmarital regime.94  
Whereas the Boyer decision contemplates article 2329’s 
application to the realm of postmarital agreements, the Louisiana 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Muller v. Muller considered its 
application to premarital agreements.95 In Muller, the parties 
executed a premarital agreement one day prior to their wedding; 
however, a notary did not witness the parties actually sign the 
document as required by law.96 At trial, the wife acknowledged 
that the signature on the document was hers, thus bringing into 
question whether such an acknowledgement could satisfy the form 
requirements that were not fulfilled prior to marriage.97 Responding 
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in the negative, the court ruled that postmarital acknowledgements of 
premarital agreements are bound by the judicial approval dictates of 
article 2329 and not the more lenient premarital standards:98 
We hold that a post-nuptial acknowledgement cannot vitiate 
the mandate of [Civil Code article 2329] that any matrimonial 
agreement entered into during the marriage to modify or 
terminate a matrimonial regime must be by joint petition, and 
after a finding by the court that the agreement serves the best 
interests of the parties.99 
Thus, the Muller decision further emphasizes the sharp line 
drawn between the contracting requirements of premarital 
agreements and those of postmarital agreements. Despite the fact 
that the parties intended to execute a premarital agreement, the 
Muller court subjected a postmarital acknowledgment of that 
agreement to the heightened restrictions applicable to postmarital 
contracts under article 2329.100 The Muller court did not take 
article 2329’s dictates lightly, opting instead to closely mirror its 
language and apply its restrictions literally. Essentially, the court 
decided that a postmarital recognition of a defective premarital 
agreement rendered the entire agreement subject to the postmarital 
restrictions embodied in article 2329.101 Such an application is 
harsh for litigants, as they are required to follow article 2329’s 
rigorous postmarital regulations even though they did not intend to 
implement a postmarital agreement. 
b. Article 2329’s Legal Regime Exemption 
In Weinstein v. Weinstein, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of 
Appeal discussed a different aspect of article 2329, providing a 
glimpse into one of the more controversial aspects of the article.102 
Specifically at issue in Weinstein was the nature of a postmarital 
agreement and whether the spouses wished to establish a community 
property regime through that agreement.103 Although the court did 
not reach a final decision as to the effectiveness of the agreement,104 
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it did recognize that the spouses intended to implement a community 
property regime through their postmarital agreement.105 In addition, 
the court acknowledged that “the law does not require that an 
agreement establishing a community property regime be authorized 
by a judge, nor does it prohibit its being approved by or 
acknowledged in front of a judge.”106  
Therefore, the Weinstein agreement did not require court 
approval in order to become effective and binding, an exemption 
that seems puzzling to many Louisiana scholars as inconsistent 
with the stated goals of article 2329.107 Scholars argue that spousal 
overreaching is just as likely to occur when contracting the 
community property regime as it is when attempting to implement 
a separate marital property regime.108 In fact, the more powerful 
spouse is just as able to take advantage of the weaker spouse 
regardless of the type of regime being implemented.109  
The legal regime exemption evidenced in Weinstein illustrates 
how article 2329 presupposes that community property is in the best 
interests of the spouses.110 However, it is easy to imagine a situation 
in which community property may not be beneficial or in the best 
interests of the spouses;111 Louisiana even seems to recognize such a 
conclusion in the overall scheme of its matrimonial regime law by 
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allowing the parties to establish a separate property regime to 
avoid community property altogether.112  
c. Article 2329’s Out-of-State Exemption 
The final sentence of article 2329 incorporates another 
exemption to the article’s general terms, noting that “[d]uring the 
first year after moving into and acquiring a domicile in this state, 
spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement without court 
approval.”113 While considering a broad range of marital legal 
issues, the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted this aspect of 
article 2329 in Hand v. Hand.114 Specifically, the couple in Hand 
married in South Carolina, after which one of the spouses relocated 
to Morgan City, Louisiana.115 A divorce followed soon 
thereafter.116 Although the Hand couple did not attempt to execute 
a premarital or postmarital agreement,117 the Court opined on 
article 2329 and its exemption from obtaining court approval for 
spouses moving into Louisiana.118 Particularly, the Court 
recognized that when both spouses acquire domicile in Louisiana 
within the first year after relocating to the state, the spouses do not 
need to petition a court to determine whether a postmarital 
agreement is in their best interests.119 Rather, the spouses may 
simply execute such an agreement on their own, defining the terms 
and conditions of their postmarital agreement without any help or 
input from the legal system.120 
Similar to the legal regime exemption explored in Muller, the 
out-of-state exemption evidenced in Hand does little to further the 
legislative goals behind article 2329.121 In fact, spousal 
overreaching is just as likely to occur in marriages that commence 
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in other states as it is in those that begin in Louisiana.122 It is difficult 
to imagine why spousal overreaching would be a phenomenon 
experienced only in Louisiana, yet this exemption seems to recognize 
such a notion by relaxing the marital contracting standards for 
marriages instituted elsewhere. 
II. A CALL FOR CHANGE: THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REVISING 
ARTICLE 2329 
The marital institution is largely in need of an overhaul. 
Prospective spouses are abstaining from marriage like never 
before, generating significant consequences for themselves and 
society as a whole.123 In an attempt to right the floundering ship of 
marriage, affirmative action should be taken to restore and 
modernize the marital institution in accordance with our evolving 
society. In Louisiana specifically, Civil Code article 2329 provides 
a promising opportunity to begin updating and improving the 
status and reputation of marriage within the state. The principles 
and theories embodied in article 2329 are problematic as applied to 
today’s society, injecting unnecessary inconvenience and 
inconsistency into the marital agreement arena. The premarital and 
postmarital distinctions within the article make little sense today, 
and the potential for abuse of the court-approval requirement is 
high.124 As a whole, Louisiana spouses should have the freedom 
and flexibility to structure their marriages on their own terms, 
which is not entirely possible under the current version of article 
2329. Thus, article 2329 should be revised with an eye on the 
future, adapting its outdated provisions to the needs of a changing 
world. 
A. The Changing Perception of Marriage: A Motivation for 
Revision  
In the State of Louisiana, as well as in several other states 
around the country, flexibility is needed and warranted in the realm 
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of marital contracting.125 In the words of one scholar, “the law of 
marital agreements should be compatible with evolving 
understandings of the meaning of marriage, including the rise of 
individualized marriage.”126 Currently, Louisiana Civil Code article 
2329 embodies legislative goals that are a product of outdated 
reasoning and antiquated perceptions of reality, illustrating the 
incompatibility of article 2329 with modern marital principles.127 
With the state of marriage in the United States currently in flux, 
outdated laws such as article 2329 serve as inviting opportunities to 
begin correcting the flaws and misconceptions soiling the institution 
of marriage and its reputation. 
As such, the rules and distinctions of article 2329 serve as 
unwarranted obstacles to a positive marriage rate for at least two 
reasons. First, standards that govern marital agreements and hinder 
a couple’s ability to alter the default rules undoubtedly work 
against the current trend of private ordering and individualized 
marriage structuring.128 Additionally, marriage standards that are 
“heavily laden with mandatory terms may not attract adherents.”129 
For these reasons, as well as several others,130 the Legislature 
should revise article 2329 to better conform to the modern needs 
and understandings of marriage. Given the decreasing marriage 
rate across the nation, the uniformity and flexibility of marital 
contracting laws would serve society well as a step in the right 
direction toward encouraging and fostering the institution of 
marriage. Scholars have long debated the appropriateness of 
distinguishing between premarital and postmarital agreements, and 
the inherent distinctions embodied in article 2329 do little to 
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promote the legislative goals cited in support of the law.131 
Therefore, given the unpopularity of marriage in today’s society, 
along with the inconsistencies and outdated requirements of article 
2329, the marital agreement law in Louisiana is ripe for change. 
B. The Shifting Socioeconomic Times: Court Approval Is Outdated 
and Unnecessary  
Similarly, the policies supporting article 2329’s heightened, 
restrictive governance of postmarital agreements are also outdated. 
The policy justifications behind article 2329’s enactment are 
grounded in the notion that marriages inherently involve disparate 
bargaining power and require oversight to guard against spousal 
overreaching.132 However, although the marriages of yesteryear 
may have involved spouses with unequal bargaining power and 
diverse educational and societal backgrounds,133 today’s marriage 
statistics suggest that such disparity is no longer prevalent.134  
Individuals who enter into marital contracts today are much 
more sophisticated and educated, and women consistently find 
themselves less disadvantaged as compared to their male 
counterparts.135 This theme of marital equality also holds true in 
Louisiana, where women are becoming more involved in the 
workforce and are contributing substantially to the financial 
stability of their households.136 In addition to boosting the marital 
equality between spouses, these trends suggest that marital 
contracts may actually provide women with more “leverage” in the 
marital context, a proposition that is entirely different from the 
inferior marital standing that was once ascribed to women.137 
Accordingly, “a new era of marriage has arrived—an individual’s 
autonomy and right to contract supersede the theory that marriage is 
a partnership wherein contracting would require greater 
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accountability.”138 Therefore, the Legislature’s goal of protecting 
the less-worldly spouse has essentially been accomplished by the 
natural evolution of society, a process through which the less-
worldly spouse has become virtually nonexistent.139 Thus, article 
2329’s postmarital contracting requirements mandating court 
approval are currently unnecessary.  
Adding to the general ineffectiveness of article 2329’s court-
approval requirement, article 2329 plainly delegates the 
determination of whether a postmarital agreement serves a married 
couple’s best interests to an impartial, disinterested judge.140 In 
making the best-interest determination, the judge is, ideally, 
supposed to consider whether the spouses “understand the 
principles and rules governing the matrimonial regime and whether 
such a regime serves their best interests.”141 However, faced with 
the personal, unique circumstances of each married couple, a judge 
is largely unable to pronounce whether that couple understands the 
agreement or whether it fits the couple’s aspirations and 
lifestyle.142 In order to make such a determination, a judge can do 
nothing “short of administering an exam to them on the subject.”143  
Overall, a disinterested judge is generally unable to determine 
the true best interests of a married couple in an effective manner.144 
Although judges presumably operated as helpful mediators 
guarding against spousal abuse in the past, these judicial services 
are no longer a necessary component of marital contracting. 
Today, statistics indicate that married individuals are more than 
able to stand up for themselves within the confines of marriage, 
having achieved near-equal levels of education and marital 
equality.145 As such, today’s married couples should have the 
freedom to structure their marital agreements as they wish. 
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Although article 2329 is outdated and unnecessary as applied 
to the spouses involved in a marital agreement, some may argue 
that article 2329 is still needed to protect the spouses’ creditors.146 
However, such an argument is largely unwarranted. The original 
proposal of article 2329 offered by the Law Institute in 1979 
“made clear that the concern in allowing spouses to enter into 
matrimonial agreements was solely for the welfare of the spouse 
whose contributions to the marriage were largely non-economic, 
and not for the interest of creditors or forced heirs”:147 
Since the judicial inquiry must focus on the best interests of 
the spouses, they should not have to prove that no harm 
will accrue to their creditors as a result of the proposed 
agreement. Creditors, like forced heirs, are protected in 
other areas of the law. Available to the creditors are the 
same remedies they have against any contract of the debtor, 
in particular, the revocatory action, the action in declaration 
of simulation, and the oblique action.148 
Therefore, a revision of article 2329 would not significantly 
affect the position or status of creditors, as they have a sufficient 
number of alternative remedies at their disposal to protect 
themselves under the law.149 Not only are article 2329’s arbitrary 
requirements unnecessary as applied to the spouses and 
prospective spouses opting to contract marital agreements in 
Louisiana, the article’s protections are also immaterial from the 
perspective of creditors, and the article should be revised to reflect 
this new economic reality of marriage. 
C. Problems of Inconsistency: Article 2329’s Exemptions Make 
Little Sense 
In addition to its outdated reasoning and antiquated policy 
rationales, article 2329 is also a highly inconsistent piece of 
legislation. Despite the Legislature’s desire to prevent spousal 
overreaching by requiring spouses to obtain judicial approval when 
contracting postmaritally, the language of article 2329 incorporates 
several exemptions from its otherwise strict court-approval 
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requirement.150 Specifically, the following individuals are 
exempted from obtaining court approval: prospective spouses; 
spouses who marry out of state and enter into a marital agreement 
within one year of moving to Louisiana; spouses who married and 
established the legal regime prior to January 1, 1980; and spouses 
who change to the legal regime by marital agreement.151 
However, the legislative goal for which article 2329 was 
created, protection of the less-worldly spouse, is hardly served or 
advanced by these exemptions. The justification for the enhanced 
scrutiny of postmarital agreements is the protection of the less-
worldly spouse, but less-worldly spouses and potential spouses 
also engage in the agreements encompassed by the exemptions 
without procedural protections.152 Criticizing the inconsistencies of 
article 2329, Professor Katherine Spaht explained why its 
exemptions make little sense: 
In the situations encompassed by the exemptions, 
overreaching by one of the parties is as great a possibility 
as in those situations not exempted. The less-worldly party 
is not necessarily any better able to defend himself or 
herself from a disastrous matrimonial agreement before 
getting married than after the ceremony, before having 
lived in Louisiana one year than after this period of 
residency, or before January 1, 1980 than after that date. 
Likewise, a change to the legal regime, which does not 
require court approval, may not always be in the interest of 
the less-worldly spouse, as when an antenuptial agreement, 
carefully planned with the aid of the parents to protect the 
less-worldly spouse, is upset by a change to the legal 
regime.153  
Thus, one is hard pressed to find a “coherent rationale” for the 
court-approval requirement of article 2329 due to its various 
exemptions.154 The exemptions effectively weaken the policy 
objectives of article 2329, doing little to prevent spousal overreaching 
and failing to fully protect the less-worldly spouse.155 Article 2329 is 
inherently “inconsistent in its attitude toward spousal overreaching,” 
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which is not surprising given the haste with which the requirement 
was added into the article during the 1979 legislative session.156  
Furthermore, the plain language of article 2329 does not 
require a married couple to seek a full-fledged judicial hearing in 
order to obtain court approval of a postmarital agreement, 
evidencing another inefficiency in article 2329’s application.157 In 
fact, the couple does not even need to personally appear before the 
judge.158 Conceivably, if the Legislature intended to protect weaker 
spouses and prevent spousal overreaching, a mandatory hearing 
would have been an appropriate procedural protection to 
implement. Without such a hearing, the more powerful spouse is in 
a position to execute a forged agreement or impose his will on the 
other spouse to sign an unfavorable affidavit, ultimately negating 
the stated goals of article 2329.  
Although spousal overreaching is not a significant concern in 
today’s society, the judiciary has nevertheless dropped the 
figurative ball in interpreting article 2329 by not requiring spouses 
to appear before the court. As such, spouses have the opportunity 
to “overreach” article 2329’s protections aimed at preventing that 
very activity. Today, the potential for spousal overreaching is not 
as amplified as it was in the past, yet the lack of a mandatory 
hearing in article 2329 calls the reasoning of the Legislature into 
question and reveals yet another problem with article 2329’s 
procedural protections. 
In addition, spouses are able to circumvent the court-approval 
requirements of article 2329 with some creative contracting 
techniques. “Spouses who believe that the requirement of judicial 
approval of all postnuptial matrimonial agreements is an 
undesirable intrusion into their private affairs may attempt to 
minimize judicial involvement by initially contracting a regime 
containing a mechanism to change it.”159 For example, spouses 
could “include in their original agreement a ‘termination’ provision 
and an alternate regime to be adopted upon the lapse of the original 
regime.”160 Legally justified as either a conditional obligation or an 
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optional, alternative regime,161 these contractual mechanisms and 
spouses’ use of these mechanisms are ultimately subverting the 
goals and requirements of article 2329. Therefore, the holes in 
article 2329’s proverbial net extend far and wide, providing several 
opportunities for willing and eager spouses to avoid the legislative 
protections embodied within the article. The current version of 
article 2329 is largely unnecessary in today’s society, a conclusion 
that is furthered by the ineffectiveness of the article and fueled by 
the potentials for abuse detailed above.  
The majority of article 2329’s intricacies may even overshadow 
the legislature’s admirable goals, creating more inconvenience than 
value. Article 2329 essentially relegates postmarital agreements to 
the discretionary regulation of a court, requiring individuals 
contracting postmaritally to comply with a strict court-approval 
requirement in order to do so.162 On the other hand, premarital 
agreements and those agreements encompassed by article 2329’s 
exemptions are not governed by similarly strict requirements.163 In 
essence, article 2329 makes agreements that are established or 
altered during marriage more onerous than their premarital 
counterparts, a result that is inconsistent with sound policy given 
the modern landscape of marriage.164 These discrepancies suggest 
that article 2329 is largely a disappointment as applied to modern 
day society. Although admittedly some safeguards may be 
necessary, article 2329 goes too far by imposing arbitrary 
distinctions and restrictions on postmarital agreements. 
D. The Obligatory Nature of Article 2329 Is Questionable 
The argument for revising article 2329 is enhanced by the 
possibility that the Louisiana Legislature may not have intended 
article 2329’s marital contracting requirements to be mandatory.165 
In fact, article 2329 is potentially a suppletive requirement that 
may be “derogated from conventionally.”166 “Neither the text nor 
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the comments to the 1979 revision impose any sanctions for the 
failure to obtain judicial approval,” suggesting that Louisiana 
couples may not need to abide by the dictates of article 2329:167  
Article 2329 arguably falls under the general category of 
supplemental law since it contains neither a commentative nor 
textual directive of absolute nullity when the parties fail to 
obtain judicial approval. Another factor supporting the 
supplemental character of this requirement is the general trend 
of increasing spousal contractual freedom. The legislature 
dropped the historical bars to interspousal contracting168 on the 
assumption that modern spouses have equal bargaining 
strength and can rely on general contractual enforcement and 
protective devices to prevent overreaching. Requiring 
mandatory judicial approval is inconsistent with this 
assumption; article 2329 should not be considered mandatory 
absent an express directive.169 
At the very least, the obligatory nature of article 2329 is 
questionable.170 Although Louisiana courts generally nullify 
postmarital agreements that do not fulfill the court-approval 
requirement,171 such action is not traceable to a legislative directive. 
Thus, despite courts nullifying agreements that do not comply with 
article 2329, one is left to wonder whether such nullification is truly 
what the Legislature intended when it enacted the court approval 
provisions of article 2329. Therefore, a revision of the article would 
help clarify its intended application, as the confusion surrounding 
the obligatory nature of article 2329 supports the idea that it should 
be revised to resolve the issue.  
E. Freedom of Contract and Bargaining Theory 
On a broader note, Louisiana has witnessed a “general trend of 
increasing spousal contractual freedom” over the last few 
decades.172 In fact, this trend is not unique to Louisiana, as many 
community property states have witnessed similar movements 
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toward contractual freedom among spouses.173 Recognizing such 
freedom as “advantageous,” one legal commentator offered the 
following insight into the significance of postmarital contracting in 
Louisiana: 
Allowing modification of the regime during marriage can be 
advantageous for a number of reasons—to utilize as an estate 
planning tool, to replace what has become an unfavorable 
system, to reflect changes resulting from the birth and growth 
of children, to reflect changes in wealth, etc.174 
It appears that Louisiana generally favors contractual freedom 
in the realm of marital contracting.175 However, article 2329 does 
not accord with this general view. Rather, article 2329 continues to 
embody strict postmarital contracting requirements, a testament to 
its outdated legislative reasoning and nonconformity with modern 
trends.  
Freedom-of-contract theory also provides a helpful response to 
some supporters of article 2329’s court-approval requirement. For 
example, advocates of article 2329 often rely on the presence of a 
similar prerequisite in an old French Code Civil article as 
justification for retaining the requirement in Louisiana.176 In fact, 
French Code Civil article 1397 also requires spouses to obtain 
court approval in order to change or implement a marital 
agreement during marriage.177 However, the incorporation of the 
court-approval requirement into the law of Louisiana is not as 
seamless as its advocates believe. A prominent Louisiana scholar 
noted that “the French legal system may be better suited for this 
kind of judicial inquiry than Louisiana’s.”178 European countries, 
such as France, are historically “less deferential to freedom of 
contract” principles than are American jurisdictions,179 lending 
support to the notion that article 2329’s court-approval requirement 
is misplaced. In the United States, where freedom of contract is a 
popular concept,180 the court-approval requirement seems rather 
                                                                                                             
 173. Id. at 163. 
 174. Id. (citations omitted). 
 175. Id. at 167. 
 176. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 68, at 94−95 n.82. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. (citing P. HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE §§ 3.11–3.21, 
7.51(c) (1967)). 
 179. Atwood, supra note 10, at 34. 
 180. See 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12.3 (4th ed.) (“[P]ublic policy . . . 
requires that parties of full age and competent understanding must have the 
greatest freedom of contracting, and contracts, when entered into freely and 
voluntarily, must be upheld and enforced by the courts.”). 




contradictory. Therefore, requiring court approval before 
implementing or changing a marital agreement seems to make much 
more sense in the French legal environment than it does in 
Louisiana. 
On a different note, a likely counterargument to freedom-of-
contract theory in the marital context lies in the inherently unstable 
nature of the marital institution.181 Specifically, this counterargument 
is founded upon the notion “that the bargaining dynamics within an 
intact marriage are materially different than the dynamics of 
premarital bargaining.”182 However, marital instability has been 
exaggerated in this regard, leading many to the unwarranted 
conclusion that spouses are unable to bargain on an equal playing 
field.183 In fact, “[b]argaining theory suggests that courts and 
commentators have overstated the likely disparity in bargaining 
power between richer and poorer spouses.”184 Moreover, even 
single-income families, in which the wife serves as a homemaker 
while the husband functions as the primary breadwinner, do not 
present concerns of contractual instability.185 
Although unbridled marital contracting will not always produce 
fair outcomes, “any injustice is likely to be the result of the spouses’ 
default entitlements and not any defect in the bargaining process 
itself.”186 Rather than flowing from disproportionate bargaining 
power, injustices in postmarital contracting will occur to the extent 
that the default marital contracting rules of the state are unjust.187 
Therefore, if the state has established an effective set of default rules 
to govern marital relationships and the separation of property upon 
the dissolution of those relationships, spouses will not find 
themselves contracting with one another on an unequal playing 
field. Any injustices that are prevented solely by imposing 
amplified restrictions on postmarital contracting are minimal.188 
As a leading family law scholar recognized, the availability of 
postmarital agreements leaves both spouses better off than they 
would be without such an option.189 Bluffing and trickery generally 
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do not influence the marital contracting process, as women likely 
have sufficient information to recognize any inopportune agreements 
presented to them by their husbands.190 Overall, “[t]he results of any 
bargain will benefit both spouses compared to their option to divorce 
under the state’s default rules.”191   
F. Privacy Concerns: Marital Agreements Are Intended To Be 
Private 
Furthermore, some scholars seem to respect the increasing 
marital equality and contractual capabilities of spouses by 
recognizing those spouses’ privacy to execute their agreements.192 
In fact, all postmarital agreements are intended to be private and 
solely a matter for consideration between the spouses.193 Moreover, 
“[n]o state requires that spouses register their [postmarital] 
agreements in any formal way.”194 Nevertheless, Louisiana seems to 
reject this notion of privacy altogether, forcing spouses to seek the 
input and approval of an outside official before implementing a 
postmarital agreement.195 Although marital agreements must be 
recorded in the public records in certain circumstances,196 such 
recordation of the agreement does not rise to the level of injecting an 
outsider’s input into the substance of the agreement.197  
If marital agreements are truly intended to be private, injecting 
the disinterested opinions of a third-party judge into the postmarital 
contracting process does little to further privacy-oriented objectives. 
As a whole, postmarital agreements are intended to be a private 
matter for a reason. Particularly in today’s society in which the 
marital playing field has largely been equalized, spouses know how 
they want to structure their marriages, and they are educated and 
worthy enough to make those decisions in private by themselves.  
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III. A SURVEY OF DIFFERING JURISDICTIONAL APPROACHES 
With premarital and postmarital agreements finding widespread 
acceptance and utilization throughout the United States,198 it should 
not come as a surprise that many states and regulatory bodies differ 
in their approaches as to how such agreements should be regulated. 
For example, the Uniform Law Commission recently approved the 
Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act, model legislation 
that serves as a prime example for states to follow in updating their 
laws governing marital agreements.199 To date, Colorado and North 
Dakota have adopted the Act in their jurisdictions, while legislators 
in Mississippi and the District of Columbia have introduced the 
Act to their colleagues for approval.200 
Another popular regulatory approach involves a careful-scrutiny 
framework in which a judge is to consider a marital agreement with 
“careful scrutiny” only if the agreement is challenged or 
contested.201 Massachusetts employs such a framework in an 
effective manner.202  
Yet another approach focuses on the notion that spouses must 
employ independent counsel when formulating their agreements, 
an approach grounded in principles of substantive fairness, which 
has been adopted by the state of Minnesota.203  
Lastly, other states opt to treat premarital and postmarital 
agreements under an identical set of standards, citing a general 
freedom-of-contract theory as justification for doing so.204 Utah 
and Wisconsin govern marital agreements in this manner, yet both 
operate slightly differently in regulating premarital and postmarital 
agreements on a level playing field. 
A. Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act 
On a national stage, the law governing marital agreements has 
undergone significant modifications in accordance with the ever-
changing world of marriage. The Uniform Law Commission 
(ULC) recently approved the Uniform Premarital and Marital 
Agreements Act, a new piece of model legislation calling for states 
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“to treat premarital agreements and marital agreements under the 
same set of principles and requirements.”205 Approved in July 
2012, the Act suggests that “parties should be free, within broad 
limits, to choose the financial terms of their marriage,” with due 
process and substantive fairness benchmarks serving as the only 
limitations.206 
As its name suggests, the Uniform Premarital and Marital 
Agreements Act covers agreements executed both prior and 
subsequent to the beginning of a marital relationship.207 After 
considerable debate, the Drafting Committee of the Act determined 
that premarital and postmarital agreements should be judged under 
the same set of standards, arguing that postmarital agreements do 
not deserve the heightened scrutiny that many states currently 
employ.208 The Drafting Committee recognized that postmarital 
agreements are characterized by a different set of risks than are 
premarital agreements, namely risks of unfairness, duress and 
undue influence, and changing circumstances.209 In response, the 
Drafting Committee concluded that the resources available in the 
new Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act, along with 
various common law principles, are “sufficient to deal with the 
likely problems related to either type of transaction.”210 
The requirement that the spouse presented with a proposed 
agreement have access to independent legal representation before 
executing the agreement is arguably the most important feature of 
the new Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act.211 Such 
access “necessarily means both the money to hire a lawyer and the 
time to find one, get advice, and consider that advice.”212 This 
requirement of separate legal representation applies to both 
premarital and postmarital agreements, ensuring that spouses in 
both circumstances have enough time and resources to fully 
consider any proposed changes to the terms of their marital 
relationships.213 At the end of the day, requiring access to 
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independent legal counsel will cut down on spousal overreaching 
and unfairness in marital contracting.214 
The objective of the Drafting Committee in the Uniform 
Premarital and Marital Agreements Act was to produce an act that 
“promote[d] informed decision-making and procedural fairness 
without undermining interests in contractual autonomy, predictability, 
and reliance.”215 Importantly, the Drafting Committee was motivated 
by the “changing socioeconomic reality” taking place in the United 
States, citing the notion that men and women are no longer inherently 
unequal creatures in marital relationships:216 
The Committee was also aware of our changing 
socioeconomic reality. Notwithstanding the persistence of 
economic inequality along gender lines, the relative value 
of marriage for men and women has been shifting since the 
original UPAA was enacted. Women have exceeded men in 
education and income growth over the last four decades 
and have almost reached parity as a percentage of the 
workforce. In almost a quarter of marriages, wives are now 
the higher wage earners, and in a majority of marriages, 
wives have an equal or higher education level than their 
husbands.217 
Providing a national perspective on the inconsistencies in 
marital contracting that are prevalent in Louisiana, the Uniform 
Premarital and Marital Agreements Act serves as a welcoming 
opportunity to revise article 2329 to conform to today’s society. 
The Council of State Governments approved the Act as “Suggested 
State Legislation” in September 2013, further demonstrating that 
the Act is ripe for adoption across the country.218  
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B. Modified Careful-Scrutiny Framework 
Massachusetts employs a careful-scrutiny test that effectively 
addresses and adapts to the concerns surrounding marital 
agreements in an appropriate, efficient, and modern framework.219 
First, postmarital agreements are not subject to a court-approval 
requirement in Massachusetts as they are in Louisiana.220 Rather, 
Massachusetts respects the wishes of contracting spouses and 
allows them to contract postmarital agreements without imposing 
any restrictions at the time of agreement.221 The only restrictions 
on postmarital agreements in Massachusetts are imposed much 
later in the process, if and when the agreement is challenged or 
contested in court.222 “In general, Massachusetts courts prefer to 
respect the right of [the] parties to freely enter into contracts. 
Postnuptial agreements are, however, subject to careful 
scrutiny.”223  
If presented with a disputed marital agreement, Massachusetts 
courts require that agreement to be “fair and reasonable both at the 
time of its execution and the time of its enforcement.”224 Although 
these principles are not legislatively codified, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court has set forth a five-factor test with which to 
determine the enforceability of marital agreements:225 
Before a marital agreement is sanctioned by a court, careful 
scrutiny by the judge should determine at a minimum 
whether (1) each party has had an opportunity to obtain 
separate legal counsel of each party’s own choosing; (2) 
there was fraud or coercion in obtaining the agreement; (3) 
all assets were fully disclosed by both parties before the 
agreement was executed; (4) each spouse knowingly and 
explicitly agreed in writing to waive the right to a judicial 
equitable division of assets and all marital rights in the 
event of a divorce; and (5) the terms of the agreement are 
fair and reasonable at the time of execution and at the time 
of divorce. Where one spouse challenges the enforceability 
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of the agreement, the spouse seeking to enforce the 
agreement shall bear the burden of satisfying these 
criteria.226 
Massachusetts does not impose heightened restrictions on 
postmarital agreements from the outset.227 Rather, all marital 
agreements in Massachusetts are simply viewed with “careful 
scrutiny” if challenged to guard against any possible mistreatment or 
unfair dealing.228 Therefore, Massachusetts couples are not burdened 
with having to obtain court approval of their postmarital agreements, 
as they are able to effectively structure the terms of their marriages 
themselves. 
C. Substantive Fairness and Independent Counsel Framework 
Similar to Louisiana, Minnesota imposes restrictions on 
postmarital agreements that do not apply to premarital agreements.229 
Specifically, Minnesota “requires that each spouse be represented by 
counsel when forming a postnuptial agreement, but requires merely 
the opportunity to obtain independent counsel when forming a 
prenuptial agreement.”230 In the realm of postmarital agreements, 
Minnesota also “require[s] that the agreement meet standards of 
substantive fairness both at the time it is signed and at the time it is 
ultimately enforced, even though [Minnesota] reject[s] this 
requirement for prenuptial agreements.”231 
Overall, postmarital agreements in Minnesota are not effective 
unless the spouses are represented by independent counsel and the 
agreement is substantively fair at the time it is signed and the time 
it is enforced.232 However, Minnesota does not require spouses to 
seek judicial approval of their postmarital agreements, but instead 
leaves it up to the spouses to decide what the terms of their 
marriage should be.233 Thus, Minnesota’s landscape of postmarital 
and premarital agreements is characterized by heightened 
restrictions on the former, but unlike Louisiana, it does not require 
an outside determination by a disinterested third party. 
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D. General Freedom-of-Contract Framework 
In Utah, premarital and postmarital agreements are treated 
under a common set of standards, and postmarital agreements are 
not subject to any heightened restrictions or requirements.234 In 
fact, a postmarital agreement in Utah is enforceable “absent fraud, 
coercion, or material nondisclosure.”235 According to prominent 
Utah family law attorney Eric Johnson, “[p]ostmarital and 
premarital agreements are generally subject to ordinary contract 
principles.”236 Essentially, postmarital agreements and premarital 
agreements are in no way different from any other type of contract 
in Utah. Overall, the state seems to completely ignore the marital 
aspect of spousal contracting, bypassing the fact that the 
bargaining parties may potentially be at less than arm’s length.  
In Wisconsin, premarital and postmarital agreements are 
treated identically by statute.237 Specifically, Wisconsin previously 
adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreements Act, a 1986 Uniform 
Law Commission proposal that the Uniform Premarital and Marital 
Agreements Act is designed to replace, for both premarital and 
postmarital agreements.238 Therefore, in Wisconsin, premarital and 
postmarital agreements are generally enforceable, unless a spouse 
proves satisfaction of one of a host of factors delineated by the 
Wisconsin legislature.239 Unlike Louisiana, Wisconsin does not 
require spouses to obtain court approval if they attempt to execute 
a postmarital agreement, nor does Wisconsin subject such 
agreements to heighted restrictions. 
IV. HOW LOUISIANA SHOULD ADDRESS THE DEFICIENCIES OF 
ARTICLE 2329: ALTERNATIVES TO PURSUE IN REVISION 
The Louisiana Legislature could pursue a few different avenues 
in revising article 2329, all of which have the potential to be 
effective in updating Louisiana’s marital agreement laws and 
philosophies. Two of the more promising solutions are incorporated 
in the following subsections. One such approach embraces the 
forethought and reasoning of the Uniform Law Commission, as 
Louisiana could adopt the Uniform Premarital and Marital 
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Agreements Act to reform the current version of article 2329.240 
This approach would help to align Louisiana with the national 
trends, which have begun to shift toward the equal treatment of 
premarital and postmarital agreements.241 As such, Louisiana 
spouses and prospective spouses would realize and experience the 
freedom and flexibility that is needed to equate marital contracting 
laws with the current landscape of the marital institution, making it 
that much easier to enter into and modify marital relationships. 
Alternatively, Louisiana could employ a careful-scrutiny framework 
very similar to the one currently utilized by Massachusetts.242 This 
approach would help Louisiana adapt to the changing landscape of 
marriage by providing spouses with more freedom to execute 
marital agreements on their own terms while retaining an aspect of 
judicial oversight to prevent abuse if the agreements are ever 
challenged or contested.243 
A. Louisiana Should Adopt the Uniform Premarital and Marital 
Agreements Act 
First, a promising solution that the Louisiana Legislature should 
pursue in correcting the inefficiencies and shortcomings of article 
2329 is to adopt the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act 
in Louisiana. The Act treats premarital and postmarital agreements 
under the same set of standards, dealing with any risks inherent in 
postmarital agreements in a more flexible and appropriate 
manner.244 By requiring spouses to obtain independent counsel and 
implementing other procedural mechanisms such as due process 
requirements in the formation of marital agreements as well as 
principles of substantive fairness,245 the Uniform Premarital and 
Marital Agreements Act effectively governs postmarital agreements 
without imposing unreasonable restrictions or undue distinctions.  
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Under the Act, spouses in Louisiana would no longer be forced 
to submit to the determinations of a judge in executing their 
marital agreements, as they would have the freedom to contract on 
their own terms. As such, Louisiana would begin to respect the 
contractual capacity of its married citizens while maintaining 
sufficient regulation through alternative procedures. By adopting 
the Act, Louisiana’s law would be much more in line with the 
modern conceptions of marriage and the needs of today’s spouses, 
unlike the arbitrary court-approval requirement that remains in 
force through Louisiana Civil Code article 2329. 
B. Louisiana Should Implement a Legislative Solution Employing 
the Massachusetts Framework 
Another viable solution is to revise the article to incorporate 
principles similar to those employed in Massachusetts.246 Although 
Massachusetts does not currently distinguish between premarital 
and postmarital agreements by statute, the state supreme court 
recently handed down a landmark decision in the marital-
agreement context that calls for the unique treatment of such 
agreements.247 Specifically, the court in Ansin v. Craven-Ansin 
delineated a list of factors that a court should consider before 
“sanctioning” a marital agreement.248 Massachusetts does not 
require postmarital agreements to be approved or ratified by a 
court, nor does it mandate the involvement of a disinterested third 
party.249 Rather, the parties are free to contract a postmarital 
agreement with the terms and principles of their choosing; the 
court system only becomes involved if the agreement is 
subsequently challenged.250 If challenged, a Massachusetts court 
will then employ the Ansin factors to ensure that the postmarital 
agreement was executed and formed properly.251 
This solution is also much more appropriate and in line with 
the marital traditions of today than is article 2329, providing both 
the flexibility and uniformity that will help attract more individuals 
to the institution of marriage. The marital agreement law of 
Massachusetts serves as a helpful example of marital agreement 
policies being adapted to the changing marital landscape of today’s 
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The complicated world of premarital and postmarital contracting is 
characterized by historically rooted, competing views as to how much 
regulation these agreements truly warrant. Although postmarital 
agreements may have deserved heightened restrictions and detailed 
approval requirements in the past, the day has come for a change. 
Premarital and postmarital agreements are a large part of the marital 
landscape in today’s society, serving as efficient mechanisms through 
which couples can manage the increasingly unstable institution of 
marriage. Therefore, the law governing such agreements should not 
retain relics of the past—adjustment is vital. Marriage is in a 
downward spiral across the country, and the Louisiana Legislature has 
the ability to begin correcting this spiral in Louisiana for the better. By 
offering flexibility and uniformity to married couples to structure their 
marriages, more individuals are likely to favor the institution and begin 
to reclaim its noted benefits. The Louisiana Legislature must revise 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 and rid the article of its arbitrary and 
unwarranted court-approval requirement.  
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